Abstract: Budget forecasts have become increasingly important as a tool of fiscal management to influence expectations of bond markets and the public at large. The inherent difficulty in projecting macroeconomic variables -together with political bias -thwart the accuracy of budget forecasts. We improve accuracy by combining the forecasts of both private and public agencies for Italy over the period 1993-2012. A weighted combined forecast of the deficit/ ratio is superior to any single forecast. Deficits are hard to predict due to shifting economic conditions and political events. We test and compare predictive accuracy over time and although a weighted combined forecast is robust to breaks, there is no significant improvement over a simple RW model.. JEL Codes: G12, C14, E43, E62, H62, H63.
Introduction
Budget forecasts are increasingly becoming a tool of fiscal management as the Financial Crisis led directly and indirectly to a fiscal meltdown in developed economies. Budget deficits that were rather contained in all industrialised economies before 2007 quickly gave way to deep budget deficits due to stimulatory tax cuts and spending hikes, financial bailouts, and the dragging on of the economic crisis. Forecasts of how the budget deficit will evolve are at the centre of political discussion in the US, Europe and Japan. In Europe, budgetary forecasts now play a key role in the preparation of economic measures under the European Semester, and in the monitoring of excessive deficits under the enhanced Stability and Growth Pact. Budget forecasts have always been a crucial part of the democratic policy process, but they are now becoming a key input of informed decision-making, and a tool to manage expectations of fiscal responsibility both towards financial markets and the public at large.
Evidence tells us that at present, budget forecasts are a poor guide to correctly assessing the fiscal outlook, especially if forecasts are produced by governments. The projections often paint a too rosy picture of reality, and are consistently biased towards too low deficits, especially when confronted with comparable predictions made by international institutions. Projections of fiscal adjustments are usually pushed forward over time, and revised when the decision nears (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010) . A large literature argues that this bias in prediction performance is the consequence of setting politically motivated targets rather than realistic economic projections.
Research into better forecasting practices of budget variables has not come to more conclusive findings. The bottom-line of most applied work is that results depend on the choice of the forecasting procedure, the consistency of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts, the forecast horizon and the level of disaggregation of fiscal forecasts. Fiscal forecasts may require as much judgement and expertise on budgetary developments as econometric or modelling techniques (Leal et al., 2008) . The unsatisfactory implication is that little 'technical' improvement is possible as any progress depends on better knowledge of the dark box of the budget process.
The unfortunate deduction is often that forecasting the budget deficit is more of an art than a science, as there are as many forecasts as there are forecasters. The fortunate implication, we argue in this paper, is that we can exploit the information contained in individual budget forecasts.
We are helped by efforts in recent years to make many budget forecasts publicly available.
In this paper, we use the judgment and expertise of many forecasters to construct a more accurate budget forecast. The way we do this is by averaging forecasts from different sources in a variety of ways. It is an established finding in the forecasting literature that averaging improves upon the forecast of any single model. We include simple as well as more advanced averaging techniques, which account for past forecasting performance, to compute a combined forecast.
Our main finding is that different combinations of budget forecasts result oftentimes in more accurate forecasts. This is particularly the case for a weighted forecast combination that values the more accurate forecasts.
Constant follow-up of forecast performance helps in improving accuracy. We show that predictive accuracy changes over time, and no single forecast is superior at all times, not even the combined forecast. Applying the predictive fluctuation test, we are able to establish that the weighted forecast combination is able to outperform other predictors in all years. Yet, the improvement in accuracy is not significant, even when compared to a random walk prediction.
Fiscal projections that are useful for government decisions are as much an art as a science, but substantial improvements are possible by using a set of budget forecasts and checking their performance. Our procedure advances over existing indicators with a 10% gain in the year ahead forecasts and a 5% improvement in accuracy of the current year forecast.
The paper is structured as follows. We first review in Section 2 several techniques for combining forecasts, and ways to evaluate and compare forecasts (over time). Data are discussed in Section3. In Section 4, we first discuss the tests to compare combination of forecasts to other forecast models, and then consider their evolution over time and in Section 5 we conduct some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Combining forecasts

Forecast combinations
A vast literature shows that the combination of various forecasts of a single variable result in improved prediction performance (Clemens, 1989) . 3 The reason for the improved performance is 3 Many authors have approached the combination of forecasts. Zarnowitz (1967) noted that the published averages of inflation and GNP growth forecasts was better than the individual ones. Bates and Granger (1969) discovered that the simple average outperform the forecasts taken individually. The idea was also to use the relative combination of variances and covariances to construct a weighted average of the forecasts that minimizes the mean square error of the combined forecasts. Likewise, Nelson (1972) and Cooper and Nelson (1975) showed that the combination of forecasts with ARIMA estimates produces a smaller error compared to the models alone. The suggested reasons for the better performance of ARMA models in their paper are the incapacity of econometric models to arrange structural changes in the economy. Granger and Newbold (1973) also start from the similar point in terms of forecast evaluation. Makridakis (1982 ) studied a large variety of time series forecasting methods which were applied to 1,001 different economic time series. The forecast performance was measured using various error summary measures. Two different combining schemes were studied: both of these combinations performed well relative to the individual techniques, with the simple average having the better performance of the two.Clemens (1989) provided a very deep review of the methods used in combining and confirming these results. Clemens and Winker (1989) give root to a combination in their philosophical approach.
that single forecasts are the product of a specific forecasting model, which may include a set of econometric techniques and personal judgment, each with a specific error due to some aspect of the model. Combining the forecasts averages out the errors. Also, models used in forecasting are reflecting stable relationships, but in the real world, political events and crises change economic relations continuously. Combination levels out the instability and any structural breaks. Further, there are many macroeconomic variables that are endogenous in the economic cycle. This means that to forecast these variables, the methods that are used for forecasts use other variables to explain the former. These proxies introduce a systematic bias in the measurement of the real value and reduce forecast accuracy. In this case, combining reduces the risk of bias. Finally, some forecasting models are constructed to minimize past errors. Combination tends to avoid the selection of the best model by this process (Timmermann, 2006) .
The aim of combination is to make forecasting practices robust to the different types of uncertainty and show robustness in various scenarios, rather than selecting a "true model" with the hope of explaining the most likely scenario in the future.
There are just two studies that support the claim that combination works well for budget projections. Marcellino (2002 Marcellino ( , 2004 We compute simple combination models that average different forecasts (simple average, geometric average, harmonic average and median), and weighted models that give different weights to each forecasts by some criterion. A combined forecast is of the form:
Where Y ୧୲ା୦ ‫כ‬ is the combined forecast at h periods ahead of the variable obtained from the i individual sources. A considerable amount of research has been undertaken to determine how best to choose the coefficients, α ୲ and β ୧୲ .
Evidence suggests that the simple approach of averaging the individual predictions works well (Lupoletti and Webb, 1986; Clemen and Winkler, 1986; Clemens, 1989) . In this case, β ୧୲ is equal to 1/n on all individual predictions. Similarly, the geometric mean and harmonic mean and the median can be used as a summary. The simple average has often been found to be the most robust forecast for a set of macro-economic variables, showing that forecasters are on average right (Clemens, 1989) .
A weighted combination gives weights β ୧୲ that depend on the past performance of forecasters. A couple of possibilities exist. One is to construct the weights from a regression of the actual series on each of the forecasts. The coefficients on each forecast are then the weights. As explained in the article of Fildes and Stekler (2002) considering that there is no "best" forecast model, a more useful approach is to look for a combination of these models that may be able to provide better results.
Different weights can even result in better performance. We follow Watson (1999ab, 2004 ) and give to each individual predictor a weight that is inversely proportional to the predictor's Mean Square Forecast Error. A discount factor δ (0.90, 0.95 or 0.99) is applied to attach greater weight to the recent predictive ability of the individual predictor. The weights for (1) are then given as follows:
Rather than applying a discount factor, we alternatively cut off the past performance after some relevant period of time so as to exclude outdated versions of forecasting models.
Other combined model used is the "Rbest". It is related with the most recently best, and the weights on the individual forecast have the lowest average squared forecast error over the previous four periods.
This 'most recently best', which as implemented here places all weight on the individual forecast that has the lowest average squared forecast error over the previous four periods.
Forecasting test
Test of predictive accuracy
Following the approach of Artis and Marcellino (2001) and Keereman (1999) we test the accuracy of each fiscal forecast, a combination of those and a simple random walk. We analyse if a combination of forecasts outperforms the performance of any individual forecast, or of the AR model. The test used in the analysis are the common ones in the literature: RMSE (root mean squared error), MSE (Mean squared error), MAD (Mean absolute deviation), and the Theil's test which compares each forecast with a naïve no-change forecast. We also apply the Diebold-Mariano test of predictive accuracy that compares a (single or combined) forecast with each other and with a simple random walk model. 4 The DM test (1995) is:
With gሺe ଵ୲ ሻ and gሺe ଶ୲ ሻ denoting the loss from forecast error evolving from a prediction model and the random walk. The null hypothesis tested is that H : E൫e ଵ,୲ା୦ ൯ ൌ ሺe ୖ,୲ା୦ ሻ.
Fluctuation test
The DM test is inadequate for carrying on forecast evaluation in an environment characterized by instability. As argued by Stock and Watson (2003) , forecasts based on individual indicators are unstable. Finding an indicator that predicts well in one period is no guarantee that it will predict well in later periods. We protect ourselves to such instability by looking at the best weighted forecast combination after a cut off.
It is possible to test if predictive accuracy changes over time. The predictive accuracy of a model relative to a competitor forecaster appears very much connected to some specific period of time, after which the relative accuracy reverses. Giacomini and Rossi (2010) formally test this idea with the fluctuation test. This test examines the fluctuations in relative predictive performance of forecasting methods over time by comparing the MSFE provided by two different models computed over rolling windows. Giacomini and Rossi (2010) derive the critical values (Table I , page 601) for testing the null hypothesis that the local relative MSFE equals zero at each point in time. 5 One can employ a rolling scheme as a sequence of a window of P observations of out-of-sample forecasts loss differences, where θ are the parameters.
that depend on the realizations of the variable and on the in-sample estimates for each model reestimated at each time t=R+h,...T over a window of size R. The local relative loss for the two models is defined over centred rolling windows of size m as:
The fluctuation test statistic is then defined as:
where the null hypothesis is that
We compute the MSFE differences over rolling windows and testing the null hypothesis that MSFE is equal to zero between the combination models, and for each combination model relative to an AR(1). If the relative MSFE exceeds the critical value in some part of the sample, we reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that there are periods during the sample that one model outperforms the other.
Data
We use deficit forecasts from both private and public forecasters both for the current year (݀ ,௧ ) and the year ahead (݀ ,௧ାଵ ) over the sample period 1993-2012. As in previous studies, the public forecasts come from four institutions: the OECD Economic Outlook, the IMF Forecast, the EC Unlike other surveys, individual forecasts in the CEF should not suffer a bias owing to the release of strategic forecasts, as often happens for official forecast released by governmental agencies (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006) . CEF data are public, which prevents a participant from reproducing others' forecasts and also limits the possibility of herding (Trueman, 1994) . Analysts are bound in their survey answers by their recommendations to their clients, and discrepancies between the survey and their private recommendation would be hard to justify (Keane and Runkle, 1990 ). In addition, and unlike other surveys, professional economists who participate in the CEF poll not only take a stance on the direction of the expected change of a macroeconomic variable, but also forecast the level of the macroeconomic variable. Evidence shows that CEF forecasts are less biased and more accurate than other surveys.
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CEF has gradually expanded the scope and coverage of the survey by including several variables for some OECD countries. We focus on Italy, with data covering the period from January 1993 to December 2011. Overall, CEF includes 42 forecasters in Italy. Our sample is a small subset of these respondents. Despite the gradual expansion of the dataset, fiscal forecasts have not always received the same attention by forecasters over time. Some forecasters stopped producing projections for the budget balance over time, while others that were initially included, left the sample owing to closure, mergers, or other reasons. Moreover, new forecasters joined the CEF survey only at a later stage. Therefore, we do not consider those forecasters that have participated just a few times in the survey. In particular, any forecaster participating less than 12 consecutive months in the CEF survey is excluded from our sample. This reduces the panel to a selection of five forecasters from Italian banks and research institutes.
The survey enquires respondents every first week of each month about current and year-ahead forecasts for a number of macroeconomic variables. The forecasts are then published early in the second week of the same month. 7 The forecasts require some transformation before they can be used in the empirical analysis.
CEF asks respondents for a forecast of the overall balance in nominal terms. 8 In order to transform this forecast into one of the budget balance as a ratio to GDP, we divide the forecast of the nominal balance (surplus) for year t+1 in a certain month m by the GDP forecast for the same year. As the CEF only provides forecasts of GDP growth rates, we compute the year-ahead nominal GDP forecast by applying the CEF growth rate to the latest available estimate for the same year GDP.
The latter is taken from IMF WEO (see Appendix A for more details).
We consider in total nine forecasters: five private and four public (OECD, EU, IMF, MEF). Table 1 shows the names of the public forecasters, and the abbreviations of the private forecasting To match the timing of the forecasts from these sources with the five CEF forecasts that are produced very month, we select only four (May, June, October and December). For the purpose of 7 Further information on how the survey is conducted is available via the Internet: www.consensuseconomics.com. 8 For Italy, specialists forecast the general budget balance for the calendar (end of the) year.
combining and comparing forecasts provided by different respondents, we use in our analysis the forecasts published in Spring (May and June) as the December forecast is too close to the end of the year to lead to divergent forecasts of the budget deficit for that year. We then compare the forecast to the realised deficit to GDP ratio for that period. Realised deficit ratio/ GDP d ୲ at time t comes from the OECD Economic Outlook. In Figure 2 , we show the deficit forecasts one year ahead provided by the same respondents. In both Figures, the forecasts are close to the actual value of the deficit ratio from 1992 to 2001. This impression may be imposed by the sharp decline in deficits in the run up to the start of EMU.
Afterwards, the forecast tends to be less accurate for each forecaster. In Figure 1 , the values are very different with much variability of forecasts between them. 
Combining forecasts and predictive accuracy
Accuracy of forecast errors
We see from Table 2 that all forecasters do much better than a simple RW model would suggest.
For the current-year forecast the weighted forecast combination and the Rbest are more accurate than any single forecaster, or any other combination of forecasts. By contrast, in Table 3 , the combination models do not generally outperform the single forecast with the exception of weighted forecast combination that is more accurate in terms of all the test of accuracy results. The Theil test (1958) shows us in figure 5 and 6 more formally the improvement in performance relative to a RW model. Any single forecast, or a combination of them, does much better.
Unsurprisingly, the accuracy is also generally better for individual and combination models in the current year as compared to a forecast in the year ahead. While a weighted forecast combination or the Rbest procedure does improve considerably the accuracy, this is not generally the case for the year-ahead forecast. In fact, respondent N4 improves by 10% over the best combined forecast (the simple average in this case). 12 The results of Figure 5 and 6 show that Rbest and Weighted forecast combination are the best performer respectively, with 13 win for current year and year ahead and 11 win for current year and 13 for year ahead. The results in the second panel show a similar picture: any combination of forecast is often better than a single forecaster, although we cannot exclude that some forecasters does always better, like forecaster N4.
Results of predictive test
Another important result of Table 4 is that -consistent with existing literature (Artis and Marcellino 2001, Ozcan 2011 ) -the naïve AR (1) model is always performing worse than any combination.
Among the combination forecasts, the most accurate one is the weighted average forecast, both in the current-year and year-ahead data. We apply the fluctuation test and the one-time reversal test -proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2011) -to analyse the evolution over time of the models' relative performance over the sample.
We do this by comparing the nine simple forecasts to the eight combined forecasts and the simple AR model. shows that the deficit forecast, whether made by private or public forecasters, is not robust to large shifts. In this case, the Financial Crisis led to a strong revision of the deficit numbers and although it has often been argued that the successive Italian governments managed to keep the deficit under control (REF&), forecasters had problems in evaluating the deficit.
As all forecasters make mistakes around the same break, the combined forecasts are suffering from the same problem. The only exception here is the WFC. The reason for its consistently good performance is that the combination puts less weight on the less stable predictions in the latter period. As the Italian government did not change behaviour so much, the model predicts the deficit relatively well.
Consistent with the evidence of the table, none of the forecasters is doing significantly better than a RW model at any point in time. Even the WFC, which was found to outperform the RW over the full sample, is not structurally stable enough to be better than a RW. 
Alternative dataset
We have so far used a baseline dataset but repeat the same analysis above also on other two databases for the current-year and year-ahead. So far, we used in our analysis only the forecasts published in Spring (May and June). As private forecasters produce a monthly forecast, and the public forecasters also a forecast in Autumn it is possible to evaluate these other forecasts too.
The closer the December forecast, however, the more information goes into the forecast which leads to a convergence of forecasts of the budget deficit for that year. We try to look as a robustness check at two additional databases. The first one include all months May and June. The second one includes the months of October and December. 1992 -1995 July, 1996 -1997 June, 1998 -2012 and EU provide forecasts and OECD in December. It isn't necessary to make an adjustments database for the Database C because there is already enough information provided by the forecasters at this time of the year therefore the data profile is more complete than in the Database B.
Results show in the figure 8 that summarise the Index Theil for the database B are consistent with the previous results. The results of the accuracy tests of these two databases B and C are consistent with the previous results. The accuracy of combination models improve. Unsurprisingly, during this last month of the year, forecasts in general are more accurate than in the rest of the year. For this reason the combination of these forecasts provide more accurate results. Also, for both current-year and yearahead forecasts, every combination model outperforms the naive model.
If we compare all combination models between them, we can conclude that also using the databases B and C the results are consistent. 
Conclusions
Despite the growing importance of fiscal projections in the short-term to inform policy-makers, control fiscal monitoring and manage expectations, practitioners seem to require a lot of judgment in making better fiscal projections. We show that exploiting the information from many different forecasters can still lead to substantial gains in predictive accuracy. Datasets that have become available in recent years, such as CEF, allow combining forecasts in several ways. Applying eight different combination techniques to the current year and year ahead forecasts of the Italian budget deficit over the period 1993 to 2011 results in substantial gains in forecast accuracy. In particular, the combination models are more accurate than individual models for 65% in the year ahead and 54% in current year and, in any case, each combination model is better than an AR(1). Given the changes in forecast performance over time, no single model is to be preferred at any time, and a combination guards against the weighted forecast combination model that provides the best performance compared by the other methods. But even then, no single combination can beat National 4. Still, combining forecasts can result in substantial gains in predictive accuracy when set off against current standards.
Appendices
Appendix A. Additional tables We construct a measure of the expected nominal year-ahead GDP forecast of forecaster i at month m and year t as follows. In the first step, we take a real-time measure of real GDP in levels for a particular year t. We use the real-time forecast of the same-year real GDP (in levels) coming from the most recent IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) vintage available at any particular month m of year t. The IMF WEOs are published either in April or October, hence from May to
October we use the April issue, and the October issue in the other months.
The second step is to compute the year-ahead GDP forecast in nominal value. We multiply the real-time (WEO) measure of same-year real GDP (in levels), , by the year-ahead market (Consensus) forecasts for GDP growth, , and inflation, , for each forecaster i at a particular month m of year t. The expected year-ahead nominal GDP value for each country is then 13 To compute the combination model Weighted forecast combination throght the regression (1) we use the forecasts available from 1992-2012 without any missing value. So we use 5 forecasters: 2 National and 3 international from database A) B) and C) 
